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Good Governance and Good Aid Allocation 
 
We model the aid allocation decision where the donor government has announced that good 
governance is the criterion for receiving aid. Potential recipients must compete for the aid 
funds. The structure of the competition is important to the donor in terms of achieving good 
governance, and to the recipients in terms of what they receive. The leaders of potential 
recipient countries look at aid availability through this contest as part of the competing 
objectives they face – some good, some not good. The donor country prefers a contest under 
which the aid will only go to one country while the leaders of the receiving countries prefer 
that each country obtains the proportion of aid relative to its governance quality. If poverty 
reduction is an independent goal as well, a poverty trap may be created. With good 
governance as a criterion, donors may work through both bilateral and multilateral agencies. 
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 Good Governance and Good Aid Allocation 
 
1.  Introduction 
While not universally embraced, a stylized fact of development policy has become that “good 
governance” is a necessary pre-requisite for foreign aid to be effective in terms of raising a 
nation’s rate of growth, lowering poverty, and generally achieving development goals. 
Allocating aid on the basis of potential recipient countries with good governance is a “win-win” 
situation:  aid is given to where it will have an impact and objective criteria can be established, 
minimizing the necessity for detailed bureaucratic planning, disbursement, and oversight. Giving 
aid to only those with good governance reduces the need for many levels of checks and allows 
the aid allocation decision to be made by those closest to the needs. 
  The good governance criterion in recent aid discussions arose during the rather lively 
debate on the effectiveness of foreign aid.
1  At the heart of the debate is the claim that aid is only 
effective in appropriate policy environment; otherwise, it will be diverted by corrupt 
bureaucracies and self-interested governments.  In spite of the dispute over the empirical 
particulars of various research, the definition of better policies, and how to measure good 
governance, there is acceptance amongst many researchers that better policies and governance 
result in more effective aid. This implies that development assistance should be conditioned on 
attaining defined levels of good governance, usually measured by reaching certain values for a 
variety of indices on good governance.
2  The introduction into the US debate of the Millennium 
                                                 
1 This debate is nicely summarized in Lahiri and Michaelowa, 2006.  See also McGillivray, 
Feeny, Hermes and Lensink, 2005, for a review and analysis of the empirical work surrounding 
this debate.  Heckelman and Knack, 2005, make the argument that aid retards economic 
liberalization. 
2  For example, the Millennium Challenge Corporation uses 16 indices grouped into three 
categories: ruling justly (civil liberties, political rights, voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption), economic freedom (cost of starting a business, 
inflation, fiscal policy, days to start a business, trade policy, regulatory quality rating) and 
investing in people (public expenditure on health, immunization, public expenditure on primary 
education, girls' primary completion rate). Last accessed, July 26, 2006. 
http://www.mca.gov/countries/selection/short_descriptions.shtml. 
  2Challenge Account and the establishment of the Millennium Challenge Corporation arose in this 
environment.
3
  The acknowledgement that good governance is important to aid effectiveness and the 
implementation of aid allocation policy based on it does not remove self-interested bureaucrats 
or corruption from the picture.  This paper assumes agents respond to a number of influences, 
including self-interest and the desire to perform well at their jobs, though these may pull them in 
different directions.  A donor desires to allocate aid on the basis of good governance.  To keep 
the modeling reasonable, we do not discuss self-interested agents on the donor’s side.  The 
agents of the donor aid agency’s agents carry out their government’s wishes to implement the 
good governance criterion for aid allocation.  What we particularly examine on the donor’s side 
is the design and implications for governance of the contest among potential recipients to obtain 
aid.  For the potential recipients, however, we look at the role and permanence of their leaders in 
these contests.   
  We model the aid allocation decision where the donor government has announced that 
good governance is the criterion for receiving aid.  Potential recipients must compete for aid 
funds.  The structure of the competition, we shall see, is important to the donor in terms of 
achieving good governance, and to the recipients in terms of what they receive. Potential 
recipients look at aid as part of the competing objectives they face – some good, some not so 
good.  The governments, represented by their leaders, are the presumed beneficiaries of bad 
governance.  Those implementing policies are explicit rent-seekers who consider aid as part of 
the total “package” available to them.     
  Donor agencies have limited resources and have to set priorities and decide on aid 
allocations. We examine and compare two contest structures that the donor may consider.  In the 
first structure, the donor gives aid to the country that invests the most effort in quality 
governance.  In the second, aid is divided proportionally according to the investment made by 
different countries in quality governance. We find the donor country prefers the system under 
which the aid will only go to one country while the leaders of the receiving countries prefer that 
each country obtains the proportion of aid relative to its governance quality.  We also separate 
                                                 
3  See U.S. Agency for International Development, 2004.  See Mavrotas and Villanger, 2006, for 
an alternative characterization of this process. 
  3the desire of the donor for good governance from the desire for poverty reduction, a consequence 
of which may be the development of a poverty trap. Recipient behavior may affect outcomes 
and, indeed, implementation can backfire in a multi-objective setting. In order to continue to 
receive transfers based on poverty a potential recipient government may deliberately allocate 
funds away from the poorest so as not to better their position. 
  In Section 2, which constitutes the bulk of the paper, we present our model and our major 
results.  Section 3 examines the possibility of a poverty trap.  Section 4 takes up another 
implementation of the model, the role of NGOs.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  The Model 
Consider the case where there exist m countries each wanting to obtain aid from the same donor.  
We assume that aid, A, is not determined endogenously; the donor has a fixed level of funds, A, 
to give out as aid.  For example, the US Congress could determine the aid budget in light of other 
budgetary items.  An aid agency, such as USAID might then decide how the aid budget should 
be divided among potential recipients. 
  Each potential recipient country has a leader who benefits from receiving aid. Note that 
the marginal benefit each leader receives may vary over countries as each country/leader may 
have different objectives or abilities in obtaining utility from the aid it receives. In order to 
simplify our model we assume that each leader benefits differentially from aid received, and the 
marginal benefit from each aid dollar is constant in each country but differs among countries.  
Denote by ni the marginal benefit the leader of country i can receive from a dollar of aid.  It is 
not clear which of the leaders had more to gain; that is whether ni  is greater or smaller than nj for 
all  . One can think of winning aid in probabilistic terms. The probability that country/leader 
i wins the contest and receives aid is equal to Pr
i j ≠
i.  The benefit country/leader i expects to receive 
in this competition equals Pri A ni.  One can also look at Pri as the proportion of total aid that 
country/leader i receives. In the two scenarios we present below, one naturally lends itself to a 
discussion in terms of the probability of winning aid, while the intuition for the other is better 
when thinking about the proportion of aid obtained.
4
                                                 
4 Proportions and probabilities are isomorphic only under risk neutrality, which is assumed. 
  4  The donor decides potential recipient countries must invest in quality governance in order 
to receive aid.  The more one invests the higher its chance of receiving aid. Obviously, good 
governance is only one of many goals that the donor may define, but we keep with the recent 
literature in presuming that the donor chooses governance as the goal on the assumption that this 
ensures proper spending of aid funds.  We denote by xi the amount of effort and investment in 
quality governance by a country/leader i.  Effort, xi, can be seen as the number or quality of 
changes in a country (xi can be a measurable index of change). The investments made by all 




  We assume that investment in quality governance is costly to a leader.  Investment in 
quality governance decreases the power of a leader; for example, a leader will have less control 
and as a result obtain fewer and smaller bribes.  Therefore, a leader sees investment in quality 
governance as a reduction in his utility.  However, investment in quality governance is part of a 
contest among countries to obtain aid.  While the utility of a leader declines as more investment 
in good governance takes place, the potential for receiving aid funds raises the leader’s expected 
utility. 
We consider two cases:   
(a)  All of the aid goes to one country.  Here we assume that the donor country gives aid to 
the country that invests the most effort in quality governance. 
(b)  Aid is divided proportionally according to the investment made by each of the leaders of 
the different countries in quality governance. 
To simplify we assume that quality governance has a fixed marginal cost of unity for 
each unit of quality governance invested by the leader.  Thus, the expected net payoff (surplus) 
for the risk neutral leader of a country is  
                                                 
5 Just because one invests in good governance doesn’t mean that it is obtained.  Moreover, some 
countries may obtain good governance with smaller investments than other countries.  Noting 
these two caveats, we assume that investment in good governance is synonymous with obtaining 
good governance. 
 
6 There exists different type of competitions over aid. On decentralization of contest over aid see 
Epstein and Gang (2006) 
  5(1)            () m i x n A w E i i i i ,..., 2 , 1 Pr = ∀ − = . 
We assume that the proportion of the aid obtained in the contest (or the probability of 
winning the contest) satisfies the following conditions:   (1) The sum of the proportions of the 
aid obtained equals one,  .  (2) As country/leader i increases its effort in quality 
















.  (3)  As the leader of 
country j, the opponent of the leader of country i, increases efforts in quality governance, the 








.  Finally, (4) the 
marginal increase in the proportion of the aid obtained from the contest decreases with 










 (this inequality ensures that the second order 
conditions for maximization are satisfied).
7   
  The leaders of the countries engage in a contest over quality governance in order to 
obtain aid from the donor country. We assume a Nash equilibrium outcome. Each country 
determines the level of its quality governance xi so that its expected payoff, , 
is maximized.  The first order condition for maximization is given by  
() m i w E i ,.., 2 , 1 = ∀

















Equation (2) is satisfied if and only if  









Thus, given the proportion of aid going to a country has decreasing marginal benefit with respect 
to quality governance, we obtain that the country with the higher marginal benefit from a dollar 
of aid will invest more effort in quality governance.  For example, if the leader of country 1 has 
                                                 
7 The function Pri(.) is usually referred to as a contest success function (CSF). The functional 
forms of the CSF’s commonly assumed in the literature satisfy these assumptions (see Nitzan, 
1994).  
  6the higher marginal benefit from a dollar of aid when compared to the leader of country 2, 












in order to increase its proportion of the aid received.  In other 
words, the leader who has the highest marginal benefit from winning the contest will invest the 
highest amount of effort in quality governance. 
  To simplify and without loss of generality assume that,  
(4)        m n n n n ≥ ≥ > ≥ ... 3 2 1
  This assumption simply states that there are leaders from at least two countries who have 
higher marginal benefit compared to leaders of all other countries.   
 
2.1   Aid given to one country only 
We now describe the situation where the donor gives all the aid to only one country.  We assume 
the extreme situation that all aid goes to the country that has undertaken the greatest investment 
in quality governance.  In other words, the leader who invests in the highest level of quality 
governance will receive the entire donor’s aid allocation, A.  The contest success function in this 
case is the all-pay auction where the country that invests the highest amount in quality 
governance wins all of the aid; however, those that do not win cannot revert to lower quality 
governance.  While some part of the quality governance is reversible, not all of it is reversible.  
To simplify we assume that none of the investment in quality governance is reversible.  
  The contest success function (CSF), the probability of winning aid under the all-pay 
auction where only one country obtains aid is given by
8
                                                 
8 Under this scenario thinking in terms of the probability of winning the contest enhances our 
intuition. 
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It can be verified that there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium as well as a continuum 
of asymmetric Nash equilibria. In any equilibrium, countries 3 through m invest zero effort in 
quality governance activities with probability one (see Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries, 1993), so 
that only the two countries whose leaders have the highest marginal benefit from aid will 
participate. 
  
Result 1:  In the contest under which aid goes only to one country, only the two countries that 
have the highest marginal benefit from the aid will invest in quality governance. 
 
  If the donor is deciding on a strategy by which to allocate aid, this contest is good only if 
there are a small number of countries competing. From the m countries only two participate in 
the contest and thus only two will invest effort in quality governance.  
  We conduct our further analysis assuming two leaders of two countries, leader 1 and 
leader 2.  Without loss of generality, assume that the marginal benefit of leader 1 from aid is 
greater than that of the leader of country 2,  .  It is clear, therefore, that leader 1 is able to 
make larger investments in quality governance than leader 2.  However, it is not clear how much 
each leader will invest in equilibrium. We can thus see investments in quality governance as bids 
of the leaders. It is a standard result that there are no pure strategy equilibria in all-pay auctions 
(Hillman and Riley (1989), Ellingsen (1991) and Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1993)).  It is 
also a standard result that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies in all-pay auctions.  Suppose 
leader 2 bids 0 < x
2 1 n n >
2   n ≤ 2 .  Then the first leaders optimal response is x1  = x2 + ε < A n1   (i.e., 
marginally higher than x2). But then x2 > 0 cannot be an optimal response to x1  = x2 + ε. Also, it 
is obvious that x1 = x2 = 0 cannot be an equilibrium. Hence, there is no equilibrium in pure 
strategies. There is a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies given by the following cumulative 
  8distribution functions (see Hillman and Riley (1989), Ellingsen (1991) and Baye, Kovenock, and 
de Vries, 1993)),  () ) , 0 [ 2 1
2
1
1 1 n x for
n
x










x G ∈ + − = .  The 
equilibrium c.d.f’s show that leader 1 bids uniformly on [0, n2], while leader 2 puts a probability 
mass equal to (1 –n2 /n1 ) on x2 = 0.  The expected quality governance investments are equal 
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An
x dG x x E
n n
= = = = ∫ ∫ .  Note that in the all-pay auction 
we can think of the designation "leader" as probabilistic – i.e., the stronger player is more likely 
to win the contest. 
  Based on these studies, we can obtain the equilibrium expected investment in quality 
governance, equilibrium probabilities and expected payoffs.   In the case of only two leaders the 
probability of winning becomes 





















  The expected investment in quality governance for each country is given by 
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n
A x E and
n
A x E = = . 
The equilibrium probability of winning the aid for each country equals 



















The expected equilibrium payoff for each country equals  




1 = − = w E and n n A w E . 
In equilibrium, the total amount of quality governance carried out by both countries (assuming 
one can add the components) equals 
















= + = . 
  9In the literature this measure is called rent dissipation.   
 
2.1.1  Identical marginal benefits from aid 
  Let us consider the case where both leaders have the same marginal benefit from a dollar 
of aid, 
(11)      n1 = n2 = n  
The investment of each in quality governance equals, 







A x E = = .  
The probability of winning aid by each of the countries equals one-half, the expected payoff for 
each leader is zero and the total invested in quality governance by both countries together equals 
the total value of aid to the leaders of the countries, 











1 = = w E w E and   .  n A X =
*
 
2.2 Aid proportionate to the quality governance of each country 
Here we consider the case where the leaders of the countries compete with one another in a 
contest in which no one wins all the aid.  In the general case there are m countries competing 
against one another.  Later in this paper we compare our two cases with each other. In the case 
where only one country gets all the aid we saw above that only the leaders of the two countries 
with the highest marginal benefit from a dollar of aid will compete.  In the case we discuss 
below, the number of competing countries has a strong impact on the expected payoffs and on 
the total amount of resources invested in activities to increase quality governance.  It can be 
shown that as the number of countries increases both the expected amount of resources invested 
in quality governance and expected payoffs of the leaders of the countries may increase or 
decrease.  This will depend on the relative levels of the marginal benefit of aid of competing 
leaders (Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries, 1993, Che, and Gale, 1998 and Epstein and Nitzan, 
2006a, 2006b).  As a result of this, and as we wish to compare our results in this type of situation 
  10to the one presented above, we restrict our analysis to the case where only two leaders compete 
for aid. 
  Each country under this contest for aid will receive an amount of funds proportionate to 
the amount of resources invested in quality governance.  We assume that the contest is 
characterized by the Tullock (1980) contest success function (see also Lockard and Tullock, 
2001), 







= Pr .  
This function states that each country receives aid proportional to its investment in quality 
governance relative to the investment made in quality governance by the competing country.  
  The expected net payoff (surplus) for the risk neutral leader of country i is thus given by 
(15)                           () 2 , 1 , , Pr = ≠ ∀ −
+
= − = j i j i x n A
x x
x
x n A w E i i
j i
i
i i i i . 
The first order condition, as stated in equation (2), that ensures the leaders of the countries 
maximize their expected payoff, is given by 
(16)                             ()
()














2 , 1 , 0 1
2
. 
Denote by   the Nash equilibrium outcome of the contest. Solving (16) for 
both leaders using a Nash equilibrium, we obtain that the level of quality governance activities of 
each country participating equals 
j i j i xi ≠ = ∀ 2 , 1 ,
*













n n A x and
n n





Therefore, in the Nash equilibrium, the proportion of aid obtained by each of the countries in this 
contest
9 equals 
                                                 
9 Under this scenario our intuition is enhanced by thinking in terms of the proportion of the rents 
obtained from the contest. 

















From (17) and (18) we obtain that the expected equilibrium payoff for each leader equals 






















= .  
And, finally, assuming we can add up the amounts of effort invested in quality 
governance of the countries, we can calculate the total amount of effort invested by both 
countries together in quality governance.  In the literature this measure is called rent dissipation.  
In our contest it tells us how much effort the leaders in the countries have invested in quality 
governance in order to increase the proportion of aid obtained from the donor country. 
  We denote this total effort invested (rent dissipation) in quality governance in 
equilibrium by 
* X , 
(20)          
j i
j i n n
n n A x x X
+
= + =
2 1 * * *  . 
 
2.2.1  Identical marginal benefits from aid 
  In the case where the leaders of the countries are symmetric in terms of their marginal 
benefit from aid, i.e., n1=n2=n (as in (11)), we obtain that the level of investment in quality 
governance for each of the countries will be identical and equal to, 







1 = = .  
The Nash equilibrium proportion of the aid obtained by each of the countries will be equal to 
one-half, 







1 = = . 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
  12The expected equilibrium payoff to each leader equals, 
(23)       ( ) ( ) A
n




* * = = ,  
ally, the total effort invested in quality governance (rent dissipation) in equilibrium 




* = ( . 
e which is better from the perspective of the donor and of 
e leaders of the recipient countries.  
pare the two situations when both leaders have the same marginal benefit 
from ai
Under the contest where aid goes only to one country we obtained from (12) and (13),  
(25)    
 
2.3 Comparing proportional aid and aid to one country 
We now wish to compare these two types of contests both from the perspective of the donor and 
from that of the leaders of the recipient countries. The donor is concerned with the level (the 
quantity and intensity) of the quality of governance in potential recipient countries.  It wishes to 
find a contest that will maximize the amount of quality governance for a given level of aid.  The 
recipient leaders wish to have a contest that will maximize their expected net payoffs. Let us, 
therefore, compare both systems and se
th
 
2.3.1 Identical marginal benefit from aid  
  Let us first com










* * = = ,   ( ) ( ) 0
*
2 1
Under a contest that each obtains a proportiona
* = = w E w E and   .  
l amount of aid relative to their investment in 
btained from (21)-(24), 
(26)  
n A X =
*













* * = = , 
2
* n A X = .    
  13It is clear, therefore, that in both cases the probability/proportion of aid received by each country 
is identical to fifty percent.  Each country when all the aid goes to one country invests more 
resources in quality governance while each of the leaders of the countries have a higher expected 
payoff under the proportional system where each country receives aid proportionate to their 
investment effort in quality governance. The more one invests the higher is the chance of 
receiving aid.  The more fungible are non-aid funds – the easier it is to change domestic patterns 
of government expenditure – the easier it is for the leader of a country to turn around the 
governance system and embark on the path towards higher quality.  Therefore, requiring that a 
country have higher quality governance helps channel resources appropriately.  Since the total 
amount of aid is fixed, the situation that maximizes the quality of governance increases the 
flexibility of non-aid funds.  It is important to notice that even if only one country is receiving 
aid bot
 the two countries competing for the funds. 
Since the donor wishes to maximize quality governance and the leaders of the countries 
wish to maximize expected payoffs we obtain,  
 the system under which aid will all go to only one country 
hile the leaders of the receiving countries prefer that each country obtains the proportion of 
aid relative to its governance quality. 
 
m (7)  - (10) that expected investment in quality 
governance, the probability of winning the aid, the expected net payoff of the leaders and the 
tal in stment in quality governance equal
h countries are investing in quality governance so the return to the aid contest, even 
though only one country is receiving aid, is from
 
Result 2:  In the case of an identical marginal benefit from each dollar of aid for the leaders of 
the country, the donor country prefers
w
2.3.2 Marginal benefit from aid is not identical  
  Now let is consider the case where the marginal benefit to the leaders from aid are not 
identical and that leader 1 has a higher marginal benefit than leader 2,   2 1 n n > .  
  In the case where all aid goes to one country, for the country that invests in the highest 
level of quality governance, we obtained fro
to ve , 
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(27) 




1 = − = w E n n A w E     and,   () ( )
1






On the other hand, under the contest where each country receives aid in proportion to its 
investment in quality governance, we obtained from (17)  - (20) that investment in quality 
governance, the probability of winning the aid e 
total investment in quality governance equals, 
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n n











































=  and 
j i
j i n n
n n A x x X
+
= + =
2 1 * * *  . 
nalyzing the relationship between the two contests from the donor's 
penditure on quality governance invested in the contest is higher 
under the proportional division of aid rather than the case where all aid goes to one country if  
(29)     
 
The Donor  
  Let us start by a
perspective. In order to receive aid the donor determines that the receiving countries must invest 
in quality governance.   
















at the total am nt invested in quality governance is higher under 
n
Equation (29) holds if and only if  
(30)          0 2 2 2 1
2
1 > − − n n n n . 
From (30) we may conclude th ou
  15the proportional system e system in which only one country receives the aid if  
(31)     
 than th
( ) 2 1 2 1 + > n n . 
Since, by assumption,  2 1 n n ≥ , the result tells us that in order for the proportional system to be 
arginal benefit of a dollar of aid to the leader of country 1 
has to be sufficiently larger than that of the other leader (more specifically it has to be more than 
better off for the donor country the m
twice as large).  We summarize this result in the following proposition, 
 
Result 3: If the ratio between the marginal benefit to the leaders of the countries is sufficiently 
large, i.e.,  2 1
1 + >
n
, then the donor country will prefer the proportional system
2 n
 under which 
the countries obtain aid proportional to their investment in quality governance over the system in 
untry that invested the most in quality governance.  
≥
leaders of the countries prefer the aid system that generates for them the maximum expected 
equilibrium payoff, 
which all the aid goes to the co
 
The leaders of the countries 
    In order to analyze the preferences of the leaders of the countries who wish to obtain aid 
we must compare their expected payoffs under both systems.  Remember that we assumed, 
without loss of generality, that leader 1 has at least as large a stake as leader 2  2 1 n n .  The  ()
( )
*
i w E .  Under the proportional aid system, the expected equilibrium net 
()














only one country equals zero,  ( ) 0
*
2 = w E .  Therefore it is clear that,  
 
  16Result 4:  The leader with the lower marginal benefit from aid always prefers the proportional 
roportional to the amoun
governance.   
  For the leader who has the higher m
payoff under the proportional system equals 
system under which each country receives aid p t invested in quality 
 
















ere aid goes only to one country equals 
while the expected 
equilibrium net payoff under the system wh
( ) ( ) 2 1
*
1 n n A w E − = .   The expected payoff for leader 1 under the proportional system is greater 
 if   than that obtained under the other system















rom equation (33) we may conclude that the proportional system benefits the leader with the 
Equation (32) holds if and only if 
0 2 2 2 1
2
1 < − − n n n n .  (33)        
F
higher marginal benefit if 
(34)       ( ) 2 1 0 2 1 + < < n n . 
In other words, 
 
Result 5:  The leader with the higher marginal benefit prefers the proportional system if the 





.    
 
  17The donor and the leader of the country with the higher marginal benefit from aid have 
ent possibilities and for each we would get different results.  Thus, in order for us to 
be able to compare the results obtained earlier we confine ourselves to the decentralized method 
under w  
both countries have the same marginal benefit 
from aid, n1 = n2 = n.  The reason here, again, is convenience and simplicity in comparing the 
results. 
conflicting preferences.  However, the donor and the leader with the lower marginal benefit from 
aid have the same preferences with regard to the type of contest to hold.  
  
3.  Poverty trap 
Now assume that the criteria for obtaining aid is not only how much you invest in quality 
governance but also the country’s poverty level.  Let  di  be a parameter capturing how bad off 
the country is in terms of poverty.  We can think of di  as the number of poor or a more formal 
measure of poverty, where increasing di indicates greater poverty.  In order to compare our 
results to the ones presented above we restrict this analysis to the decentralized division of aid 
under which countries obtain aid in proportion to the level of investment in quality governance 
(as well as the poverty level).  We do not analyze this in the system where aid all goes to one 
country as then we have to determine the criteria under which the "best" wins.  This will give us 
many differ
hich each receives a proportion of the aid allocation.  Moreover, in order to add emphasis
to our results we will consider the case where 
Let the contest success function, the proportion of aid received by country i, be equal to, 
(35)       i j for






= Pr . 
Each country under this contest for aid will receive funds proportional to investment in quality 
ontest success function (see also 
Epstein, 2000). 
governance and the level of poverty.  The donor allocates aid based on the level of poverty (more 
poverty, more aid), making the probability of receiving aid increase with greater poverty. This 
contest success function is a variant of the Tullock (1980) c
  18  The leader of each country invests in quality governance, xi, and decides whether to invest 
in poverty reduction (lowering di) or not (either allowing poverty to stay the same or increase).  
The expected net payoff of the leader of country i is given by  
(36)                         () 2 , 1 , , = ≠ ∀ − −
+
= j i j i d x n A
x j d x i d
w E j i
j i
i . 
x i d i
r both players we obtain that the optimal investment in 
quality governance and in poverty (that is, having poverty increased) equals, 
Solving the first order conditions fo
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and the probability of winning and the total expenditure on quality governance equal,  
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X . 
As we can see from this example the results in terms of the donor country are identical to those 
e obtained when there was not an option to increase the proportion of aid received based on the 
esult 6: If the donor introduces a condition under which the portion of aid received by a 
 good governance, then this induces 
the country to invest in ways that increase poverty while at the same time increase resources 
w
poverty level (see (21)-(23)). In both cases the leaders of the countries invest the same amount of 
resources.  Thus, both leaders receive in the two cases the same proportion of aid, invest the 
same amount of resources in quality governance and at the same time spend effort and resources 
in a way that poverty increases (of course, one measure of good governance could be poverty 
reduction).  In other words, such a policy by the donor country will increase poverty.   
 
R
country is a function of the poverty of a country as well as
invested in quality governance.  Such a system creates a poverty trap causing the leaders of the 
countries to invest in order to raise the poverty level so as to obtain a higher proportion of the 
available aid.  
  19 
4. NGOs verses donor countries 
Now assume that countries that have a small amount of resources to donate will choose to do so 
directly to one country.  On the other hand, NGOs may have many more available funds and 
ith returns to scale would be more able to give their resources to many countries.  Assuming 
e NGO have the same goals we may conclude, 
rnments opportunities to shift resources from expenditures intended 
on of structural adjustment aid in the 1980s – aid policy has 
e
 a 
how to allocate aid when good governance is the established criterion.  The donor is interested in 
w
the donor and th
 
Result 7:  In the case of m > 2 countries competing for donor resources, the donor takes part of 
the resources and lets two of the countries compete for it in the way that the one with the highest 
quality of governance receives all the funding.  It gives the rest of the funding to NGOS who 
divide the aid proportionate to the amount of resources invested by each of the countries. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
Aid provides recipient gove
by donors into other activities.  Presuming the donors’ desires are honorable and helpful, 
fungibility can undermine the effectiveness of aid.  The empirical literature has not been able to 
provide a robust measure of the degree of aid fungibility (Gang and Khan, 1990, 1999; 
Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu, 1998; McGillivray and Morrissey, 2001). Never-the-less for many 
years– at least since the introducti
assum d near 100% fungibility.  The recent discussion on good governance is no different; since 
aid effectively supports the entire public sector, establishing good governance is a pre-requisite 
for the effective use of aid. 
  There is, of course, an extensive discussion of many issues surrounding the concept of 
good governance, for example, what it means, how it can be implemented, and at what rate does 
good governance translate into good development outcomes.  The presumption by academics and 
aid practitioners is that good governance cannot hurt, and should therefore be pursued as
criterion on which to allocate aid. 
  This is where we start.  We discuss and compare choices facing the donor in deciding 
  20achieving the highest aggregate level of good governance, that is, the sum of efforts made by all 
potential recipients.  The donor wants maximum rent dissipation. One of the contests we have 
the donor consider is winner-takes-all, where potential recipients compete to establish good 
governance but only one receives aid in the end.  The second contest is where aid is divided 
proportionately among potential recipients based on their efforts to achieve good governance. 
  Recipients are not passive.  They have objectives of their own; in particular, their leaders 
may have their own programs.  What drives our model is the donors’ desire for good governance 
and local leaders’ desire for long-term gain.  Our main result is that the recipient who is most 
effective in governance – and stands to benefit the most from development assistance – has 
terests opposite to those of the donor.  This brings in a role for multilateral agencies and non-
government organizations (NGOs) who may choose a different contest than the donor.  In doing 
so rent dissipation can be increased.  We also discuss the addition of a second criterion for aid 
allocation – the desire of the donor to directly address poverty.  A consequence of these multi-
objective goals may be the development of a poverty trap: in order to continue to receive 
transfers based on poverty a potential recipient government may deliberately allocate funds away 
from the poorest so as not to better their position. Incentives often work in non-obvious ways. 
 
in
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